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Serrano: A Victory of Sorts for Ethics, 
Not Necessarily for Education 
Paul R. Dimond 
Coons, Clune and Sugarman uncovered Proposi-
tion 1-"the quality of public education may not be 
a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state 
as a whole"l-and artfully spread the word, much like 
any suitor who had experienced paradise and wanted 
all to share in the bounty. 2 With the help of numerous 
commentators, various political allies, and capable 
trial attorneys-midwives all 3-the California 
Supreme Court despite a few ramblings overcame 
earlier miscarriages elsewhere4 and gave judicial birth 
to Proposition I in Serrano v. Priest. 5 Serrano's first 
step-child, Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 6 even improved 
on the original proposition: 
the level of spending for a child's education may not be a 
function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a 
whole.7 
In practical terms, Serrano and Van Dusartz stand 
for a principle of "fiscal neutrality": state systems of 
school finance in which per pupil expenditures vary 
directly with the relative wealth of local school 
districts cannot meet the Constitutional test of Equal 
Protection. The minimum remedy which flows from 
such a conclusion is that the same tax effort by local 
school districts must result in the same level of ex-
penditures per pupil. That would require a revolution 
of sorts: no longer could districts with high tax bases 
per pupil spend more money per pupil with less tax 
effort than districts with low tax bases per pupil. 
Instead, at a minimum, the capacity of each school 
district to raise revenues per pupil would have to be 
equalized.B 
As there are now several tens of cases vying for 
the role of next child, this article will attempt (1) to 
critically exar)line the judicial, constitutional, and 
practical underpinnings of Proposition I and (2) to 
speculate about its possible effects on American 
education. 
I. The Assumptions of Proposition I, Judicial, 
Constitutional, and Practical: A Well-
Constructed House of Straw 
A. The Political Judgment: What Theory bas the 
Best Chance of Winning, or at least·not losing, 
for Awhile 
At the very heart of Proposition I is an odd respect 
for judicial restraint: declare what now exists in 
financing public education unconstitutional so that 
legislatures may be freed from the present yoke of 
the dominant special interest groups to finance educa-
tion in a basically more ethical and-hope springs 
eternal for all constitutional law reformers9-more 
innovative and effective way. At the outset it must be 
understood that Proposition I knows its place: in an 
attack on a politically universal system of financing 
education, Proposition I seeks to influence courts to 
free others to do the initiating but carefully avoids 
requiring the courts to bludgeon the states into sub-
mission. That is not just because the constitutional 
underpinnings for Proposition I are unfirm; it is 
because Proposition I is being pressed by able 
advocates who have artfully attempted to carve a 
place for judicial action where none existed before 
and actually get jurists to assume it. 
The answers to everything about Proposition I are 
not yet at hand. If all the answers were clear, an 
activist court might impose a remedy on the state 
rather than await a political response to a judicial 
declaration; and that, know the discoverers of the 
delights of Proposition I, probably is too much for 
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Proposition I are apparent, only judges who wish to 
act in the absence of outside data and support will 
accept it; that would be too little for the Supreme 
Court. Proposition I succeeds (and only in the sense 
of getting a judicial declaration of present wrong) 
therefore, only if some, but not too many, answers 
are apparent. 11 Thus Proposition I is a carefully 
calculated political strategy designed to persuade 
courts to intervene where they have not before. The 
measure of its success, however, is not just the 
obvious, Serrano and Van Dusartz; its success will 
also be gauged by how long it can convince courts 
and legislators generally that it is so right that action 
is required "consistent" with it. 12 The answer to the 
question "how long" remains unclear; and as long as 
that uncertainty remains, Proposition I can continue 
to engender "consistent" action in a variety of states 
-in courts, legislatures, executive offices, and 
lobbyists' headquarters alike.rn 
B. The Constitutional Argument: Education as a 
"Fundamental Interest" and Wealth as a 
"Suspect Classification" 
In a series of cases14 in the fifties and sixties, the 
Supreme Court departed in some areas from its 
traditional mode of testing the validity of statutes 
challenged under the Equal Protection clause of the 
14th Amendment and adopted a more rigorous 
test. 15 This test simply stated is that when a "funda-
mental interest" is affected by a state classification, 
or if that classification is "suspect"-i.e., one of a 
few classifications that the Court feels are generally 
unjustified-or if there is any combination of 
"suspect" classification and "fundamental" interest 
extensive enough to produce a proper "prejudice 
variable," then the Court will examine the classifica-
tion with "strict scrutiny." The initial rub, of course, 
is defining what are "fundamental interests" and 
"suspect classifications." 
Proposition I tackles this area head-on by arguing 
that education is "fundamental"16 and classification 
on the basis of wealth is "suspect."17 Neither of these 
designations, apparently, has been accepted by the 
Court. 18 Yet there are some Supreme Court decisions 
which suggest that the argument has merit and several 
lower court cases in addition to Serrano and Van 
Dusartz which have adopted one or the other of the 
arguments. 19 If these two designations are accepted 
by the Court, then, in theory, the equal protection 
clause will trigger closer judicial scrutiny of the 
challenged finance scheme, and require that it be 
justified by a showing that it is necessary-Le., no 
less onerous alternative exists-to promote a com-
pelling state interest. 20 Unfortunately, the Court has 
not shown any consistent willingness to package its 
decisions in the neat labels suggested by this 
approach.2 1 
It would serve no purpose to discuss at length here 
why challenged actions which involve education 
should be considered "fundamental" or should stir 
the Court to closer scrutiny than merely a search for 
bare rationality. Suffice it to note that education is 
important and distinguishable in several respects from 
many other public "goods" and that the Court has 
not yet squarely held that education is fundamental. 22 
Beyond that, advocates on all sides can only await 
further action by the Court. 
The second Constitutional leg on which Proposi-
tion I stands-that wealth is a suspect classification-
deserves more discussion. For it is in the nature of 
how the school finance schemes are viewed as wealth 
classifications that the ethical claims of the proponents 
of Proposition I can best be understood and ruled 
upon. The theory's proponents place much reliance 
on cases like Griffin v. Illinois, Douglasv. California, 
andHarperv. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 23 which 
suggest that in some instances poor persons should 
not be disadvantaged simply because they do not 
have the money to purchase certain public goods, 
"just wants" under our present system of government 
and state of society. 24 Yet the disproportionate 
impact of present school finance schemes on poor 
persons is merely window dressing to Proposition I. 2 5 
It may be invoked to tug the heartstrings of a few 
judges, but it is basically irrelevant.26 Rather, the 
main thrust of Proposition I is that the entire scheme 
of school finance-with its reliance on differences in 
the taxable wealth between local school districts to 
generate systematic disadvantage in terms of dollar 
expenditures per pupil for poor districts as compared 
with rich districts-is in all respects an "unfair," 
state-created wealth classification. The very founda-
tion of the inequities perceived by Proposition I is 
the state's creation of school districts with boundaries 
around areas with different wealth concentrations, 
and its investing these areas with the power to reap 
only their own education dollar abundance or 
poverty. The very classifying fact of such school 
finance schemes is wealth. 2 7 The issue is whether the 
Court will ultimately view that classifying fact as an 
illegitimate means28 of distributing dollars for public 
schooling. 
Unless James v. Valtierra29 is merely an aberration 
resulting from Justice Black's love of the referendum 
as a democratic institution, it is probably lucky that 
Proposition I is not concerned primarily with pro-
tecting poor persons. For, in conjunction with 
Dandridge v. Williams, 30 Valtierra suggests the end 
of the Court's apparent general concern for protecting 
the poor from serious disadvantage under equal pro-
tection analysis. 111 The fate of Proposition I rests on 
whether it can compel the Court to share the view that 
there is something undeniably and ultimately "unfair" 
about a financing scheme for public education which 
is a state-created wealth classification and which 
rewards rich districts for being rich and punishes poor 
districts for being poor. 
If Valtierra turns out to be an accurate indicator 
I suspect that the Court will not be won over. One ' 
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notion expressed in Valtierra in particular leads me 
to be skeptical: 
this procedure [the referendum to determine whether 
low-income housing can be built in a municipality] insures 
that all the people of a community will have a voice in a 
decision which may lead to larger expenditures of local 
governmental funds for increased public services and to 
lower tax revenues.32 
This statement is premised on the fact that "all the 
people" necessarily excludes the poor who have not 
yet gotten into that community. The "referendum" 
in education finance cases that is equivalent to the 
public housing referendum in Valtierra is the local 
millage election. And, as in Valtierra, only those 
persons already "in" the community reap the benefits 
or bear the burdens of that election, while those who 
are seeking to enter the community (and who may 
be an additional financial burden on the community) 
have no voice whatsoever.33 
The basic ethical assumption in Valtierra is that in 
America there is a strong interest in allowing people 
to live in local governmental sanctuaries in which 
tax burdens can be avoided. A corollary interest is 
that persons should be permitted to live in local 
governmental sanctuaries which spend a greater share 
of their tax revenues on schools as compared with 
welfare.34 Stated simply, the ethic is this: an individual 
should be able to move from a city where only 30% 
of his tax dollar is spent on his children's education 
to a suburb where 50% is spent if, of course, he does 
not unfavorably affect the relationship between 
municipal costs and tax revenue; the individual should 
be able to move from a rich industrial town to a poor 
rural environment if he is willing to take on either a 
greater tax burden or accept a lower cost education. 
This ethic of the "market model" of individual 
residence applies with equal vigor to the location of 
commercial and industrial property: let each locality 
fight with relative tax breaks and municipal bond 
incentives for getting new business and retaining 
old. 35 It is beside the point that such an ethical view 
ignores the fact that the poor (and more particularly 
the black) cannot participate fully in competition for 
residences, that the market is structured by state 
actions which reward and protect some persons for 
simply being rich, that local governmental entities 
assume life independent of the hand of the state 
which in theory created them, and that in many other 
respects it is fiction. The almost incredible rejoinder 
of .the market model approach to Proposition I is that 
the ethical view of Valtierra may be acceptable in 
America in 1971 to a majority of the final interpreters 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 
The hope of Coons, et al. is that the Court will 
adopt a different view of ethics in deciding the final 
fate of Proposition I than it did in deciding Valtierra. 
The advocates of Proposition I must, therefore, con-
vince the Court that "education" is somehow funda-
mentally different from "housing"; despite all the 
persuasive arguments and skills that Coons and 
company can muster on behalf of Proposition I, their 
constitutional argument may well be less than con-
vincing when it finally encounters the Supreme Court. 
C. The Practical Problems: "Wealth", "Tax 
Effort", "Equal Capacity", and a "System of 
School Finance" Undefined 
For Proposition I to succeed in the Supreme Court, 
a necessary precondition is that it must define with 
precision what its declaration means and isolate 
education finance from the rest of the system of 
financing public services in the states. a 7 Proposition I 
does not attempt to attack the unequal financing of 
all major public services, such as garbage collection, 
sewer systems, police protection, and transportation 
facilities. It attempts by definition to isolate the 
system of public school finance from other revenue 
raisingsystems of the state: by definition it declares 
that the "wealth" of a school district is defined by the 
taxable assessed valuation of property per pupil; 
"effort" is defined as the rate of mill levy for financing 
schools; and "equal capacity" is defined, therefore, 
as raising equal dollars per pupil from the same tax 
rate. Unfortunately, as simple as this definitional 
approach may sound, there are competing definitions 
for "wealth," "effort" and "equal capacity" which 
tend to diminish the distinctions between a state's 
and a municipality's system of financing public educa-
tion and its methods of financing other public services. 
These competing definitions take into account the 
importance of other revenue needs of a community, 
differential costs of school and other public services, 
and possible sources of taxing power other than 
taxable assessed valuation on property. 
As an example, consider the claim of an urban 
area that it has a tremendous tax burden from non-
educational expenditures, such as police, fire, sani-
tation, welfare, and hospitals, a burden which is 
much greater than in many suburban and rural areas. 
Many citizens who live in communities with such a 
greater tax burden will argue that "equal effort" is 
not measured by the mill rate adopted for school 
property taxes; the entire tax effort must be con-
sidered. The response of a cynic, who is imbued with 
the full spirit of Valtierra, to this situation is to 
suggest that school finance cannot be so isolated from 
the rest of the local government's fiscal package for 
special treatment: why should a suburban lffea pay 
New York City for its inability to negotiate as toughly 
with its public employees or keep as many of the 
supposedly burdensome poor people from living in the 
City as the suburb? There is no one who can yet 
precisely define the urban factor or municipal over-
burden, but somehow the cynic's response seems 
inaccurate. 3 s 
As another example, consider the definition of the 
"wealth," or fiscal capacity, of the school district to 
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be paid from income1 it is not clear why asse~sed, or 
even real market, value of property per pupil is a 
correct measure of wealth. Retail sales per capita or 
household and effective buying income per capita 
or household are competing definitions with as much 
claim to accuracy.ll 9 Moreover, in districts where the 
property tax is not the sole source of education 
finance, or there is no separate education tax at all, 
the application of the particular definitions in 
Proposition I become nonsensical and their replace-
ment by more enlightening definitions improbable. 
Thus it is uncertain what the correct definitions of 
"tax effort," "district wealth," and "equal capacity" 
are and what they mean. 
An additional difficulty is that any decision 
requiring "fiscal neutrality" in public school finance 
136 alone in practice may well affect the entire fiscal and 
tax package of states and localities. If education 
expenditures constitute between 30 and 50% of all 
state and local tax dollars, tinkering with the educa-
tion finance structure cannot help but affect what 
occurs in the financing of all other public services. 
What the effect will be is not entirely clear: what will 
happen to the overall tax structure and level of 
funding for other public services in districts with high 
tax bases but heavy competing demands for tax 
dollars from other municipal services or in poor 
districts with no such competing "needs," or in all 
variety of urban, suburban, and rural districts with 
any mix of these? ls it fair to say that the education 
priorities of a community, as established relative to 
all other public and private spending, can be ac-
curately judged in such circumstances by the mill 
rate it chooses to impose for school taxes? I cannot 
claim to know; in fact I have not the vaguest notion 
of what the effect of "fiscal neutrality" in school 
finance alone will be on other public taxing and 
spending and private consumption and saving. I only 
know that Coons, et al., bear a high burden of proof 
that it is possible to tinker with "just" the public school 
finance scheme. 40 I suspect that requiring reform of 
public school finance systems will have a considerable 
impact on the patterns of all other public and private 
systems of raising and spending money. Those dis-
inclined by philosophy to judicial intervention will 
be immensely troubled by that spectre, and especially 
by its unknown contours. 
In summary, Proposition I may be an artfully 
constructed house. In many particulars it is entirely 
appealing. But there has been no showing that it yet 
has enough power to hang together in the face of a 
conservative court bent on judicial restraint. Some 
of the weaknesses no doubt are remediable; they can 
be buttressed by new arguments and statements of 
fact. But, I fear, not enough are. It would be an 
appropriate irony if in the end the house fell before 
the very concern for judicial restraint oh which it is 
built. 
That in no way suggests, however, that Proposi-
tion I cannot in the meantime "succeed." Proposition I 
does present a very close question to the Court and 
the outcome will remain in doubt until the fipal 
decision. Therefore, even if the basic concern with 
fiscal neutrality is not ultimately compelling to the 
United States Supreme Court, it still may persuade 
many courts, legislatures, and executives to act 
affirmat·ively until .the final day of reckoning arrives. 
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II. The Possible Effects on American Education of 
Implementation of Proposition I: A Clouded 
Horizon. 
Just as the effect of Proposition I on present 
patterns of American economic life and location of 
people and property is unclear, so is its effect on 
American education. 
First, and most obvious, it is simply unclear which 
of the many permissible responses to Proposition I 
any state legislature will choose. Among the types of 
permissible alternatives are: funding on the basis of 
school district characteristics, such as, tax effort or 
number of children; funding on the basis of family 
characteristics, such as tax effort or level of parent 
education; funding on the basis of child characteristics, 
such as "childness"41 or the age, need or giftedness 
of the child; funding with or without state assump-
tion of the entire school tax burden; funding by 
distribution of moneys to districts or directly to the 
family in the form of a voucher;42 funding accom-
panied by centralized administration of schools or any 
degree or form of decentralized administration of, 
or choice among, schools; and any and all combina-
tions and variations on these themes. In large part, 
therefore, any discussion of the ultimate effects on 
education must await particular states' implementation 
of particular remedies. 
Yet, just the fact that this variety of remedies exists 
suggests that any state which is placed under the 
Serrano mandate to revise its school finance system 
will be free to examine the variety of permissible 
remedies carefully and tailor a response to the political 
will of the powers that be. As Coons, et al., would 
have it, 
the range and variety of legislative response in fifty states 
to the judicial establishment of Proposition I is radically 
unpredictable .... Considering the multitude of potential 
compromises ... it is clear that the Supreme Court has the 
capacity to touch off an explosion of creativity in the struc-
ture of education. It is an opportunity that in importance 
can be compared only to the first flowering of public educa-
tion in the 19th century." 
Such optimism, as pleasing in appearance as it may 
be, is difficult to share. Something will happen if 
Proposition I is accepted; but whether flowers, 
brickbats, false hopes, or more tawdry political 
ineffectiveness will bloom is not clear. One might even 
wish that Proposition I would spur all fifty states to 
act, for a change, as the laboratories of democracy; 
more likely the states' drive for uniformity will as usual 
triumph, and all the states with no good reason will 
jump for the same remedy. 
Second, and almost as obvious, there probably will 
be some reshuffling of who gets how many education 
tax dollars. Districts which are currently poor are 
likely to get more tax dollars relative to the rich, 
whatever the remedy. 44 It is not likely, however, that 
poor children will share proportionately in this gain. 
Aside from the fact that many poor children may 
reside in districts richer than the average, the present 
practice of most loc~l school authorities in no way 
suggests that wealth privilege exists only between 
school districts. Rather, within school districts, poor 
children are often systematically disadvantaged 
relative to rich in the share of the state and local 
education dollars spent on them.45 
Third, and to many not obvious at all, any re-
shuffling of dollars-if spent within the present range 
of variability on more highly paid teachers, reductions 
in class size, and buildings-is not likely to have 
much effect on the tested cognitive skills, on the 
credentials necessary for entrance into honors 
programs, jobs, or college or on the values of the 
children. 46 What the reshuffling of dollars will do is 
reshuffle teacher salaries in rough proportion. That 
such a result will not materially alter the outcome of 
schooling for the child should not be all that sur-
prising. Teachers, like the rest of us, are not paid for 
how well they perform (even if we could define what 
performance means).47 
Stated s,imply, no one knows how to use money to 
buy "quality" schooling, both because we are unsure 
how to define "quality" and how to "purchase" it. 
After all, the notion that money buys quality is often 
just the shared myth of conservatives and liberals, 
labor and business; for that very reason money, of 
course, does count in some very important ways, but 
not necessarily to buy better educational outcomes 
for the children. 48 That in no way suggests that 
dollar expenditures per pupil should not be reshuffled; 
indeed, any time the society invests systematically 
fewer dollars in the education of the poor children 
than the rich, it says all too much about our lack of 
willingness even to try to make schooling a path to 
mobility and success for all children. 49 
Poor persons deserve the same opportunity as the 
rich to try to make schooling have an effect indepen-
dent of family background.50 Moreover, the poor 
also deserve the same opportunity as the rich to 
define what should be viewed as the "effect" of educa-
tion-for example, whether values or credentials are 
more important than cognitive skills as presently 
measured. It is not at all clear that merely reshuffling 
dollars between districts guarantees either oppor-
tunity. Guaranteeing these opportunities probably 
requires transferring power over schools in which the 
poor are presently isolated from central bureaucracies 
to each school community, transferring children-
both rich and poor-instead of just dollars, or trans-
ferring choice over schools from the financial ability 
to purchase a home or a private education to equal, 
and completely publicly supported, choice for all 
families among diverse educational institutions. 
The ultimate tragedy will be if courts and legis-
latures begin to think fuzzily about "equal educational 
opportunity" instead of these other issues. Proposi-
tion I, at least, makes courts view wrongs not in terms 
of educational "quality" but in terms of measurable 
resources like dollars, and admittedly unmeasurable 
ethics. 51 Proposition I states only that especially in 
the schools we should have some ethical distribution 
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enough to make courts and legislatures-the people-
begin to think about other issues of ethics involving 
poverty of children (and not poverty of districts), 
race, control, diversity, and choice may be more 
important than whether courts and legislatures 
respond to its narrow focus. I fear that Proposition I 
from the beginning has lacked that power; it was 
carefully designed as a politically acceptable revolu-
tion. 52 Its judicial liberation of the political decision-
making process for new thought, therefore, is limited 
to the thinkable. But that may be a start. 
Yet the fundamental wrong in our present system 
of education remains as always racial segregation. 
We need to admit that wrong and act to eradicate it. 
Indeed the saddest commentary on our present situa-
tion is that control, choice, diversity and resource 
allocation all become immediately thinkable and 
politically feasible only when present patterns of 
state-imposed segregation-North as well as South-
are threatened by local initiative or judicial action. 53 
It is for this very reason that the Constitution should 
make maximum feasible desegregation the paramount 
priority; only then can we be sure that any new 
reforms are not just subterfuges to perpetuate the 
cancer of segregation in our society, especially in 
the schools. 54 
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Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91,95 (1966); 
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 
1065, 1120 (1969); Michelman, 83 Harv. L. Rev. at 34; 
Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the 
Return of the 'Natural-Law-Due-Process' Formula, 16 UCLA 
L. Rev. 716, 739 (1969). 
16. See Sugarman at 397-409. 
17. SeeSugarmanat359-387. 
18. For a few years, at least until James v. Valtierra, 402 
U.S. 137 (1971), we had good reason to believe that wealth 
classifications were suspect. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 14. 
19. See, e.g., Supreme Court decisions cited in Sugarman at 
359-409, passim, and Hoosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 
(D.St. Croix 1970); Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 
(D. Mass. 1971). 
20. See Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 14. 
21. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1970) 
("wealth"); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (race). 
Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (travel 
and resident aliens). See also, Michelman; Ely, Legislative 
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 
Yale L.J. 1205 (1971); Dimond, School Segregation in the 
North: There is But One Constitution, 7 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. 
Lib. L. Rev. 1 (1972). Given these ambiguities, it would seem 
wise for the advocates of Proposition I to couch an alternative 
set of arguments based on education and some notion of 
ordered liberty, rationality, or fundamental fairness under 
the Due Process rubric. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 
497 (1954); Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 391 (1922). 
22. But compare, Griffen v. Prince Edward County, 337 
U.S. 218 (1964) with Palmer v. Thompson, supra note 21; and 
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1969). Cf. Developments in 
the Law of Equal Protection, supra note 15, at 1127-1129. 
23. See supra note 14, for citations. 
24. Cf. Michelman and United States v. Carolene Products, 
304 U.S. 143, 152-153 n. 4 (1938). 
25. Compare Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal 
Protection, 38 Harv. Ed. Rev. 635 (1968). 
26. Indeed it is not clear in many states that children of 
"poor" families are singled out for disadvantage: many poor 
children reside in school districts-like San Francisco and 
New York City-which are considerably above the statewide 
average in tax base per pupil. The Serrano complaint, insofar 
as it relies on disadvantage to individuals, merely suggests 
that plaintiffs represent the class of all persons but those in 
the wealthiest school district. And that is a far cry from the 
particularized disadvantage to a relatively small number of 
people in cases like Griffen, Douglas, and Harper. (I should 
note that my heartstrings, judicial and otherwise, are mo-
tivated primarily by this windowdressing: if I had the power 
to declare a different Proposition I-perhaps, Coons, et al., 
will make it Proposition II-it would be that children of 
poor families should not have fewer dollars spent on their 
education per child than those of the rich. See Brief, Amicus 
Curiae, of the Center for Law and Education filed in Serrano. 
That means that any final value judgment I might make about 
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state by state, of the coincidence of family poverty and 
district wealth, school tax rates and school expenditures.) 
27. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). I suppose 
Professor Michelman would even be tempted to agree that 
this constitutes a de jure wealth classification. 
28. Some may question whether district effort is any more 
legitimate a criterion than district wealth for the allocation 
of educational resources: neither bear much relationship to 
the independent interest of children (and society) in their 
learning. See Kirp and Yudof, supra note 3, at 625-6; 
Dimond, Toward a Children's Defense Fund, 41 Harv. Ed. 
Rev. 346, 394 (1971). 
29. Supra note 18. In an opinion by Justice Black, the Court 
upheld a California Constitutional Amendment that required 
community referenda on all decisions of public authorities 
to initiate low-income public housing developments in that 
community. The Court in Hunter v. Erickson, supra note 11, 
had held that a similar referendum procedure dealing with a 
race (rather than wealth) classification violated the Equal 
Protection clause. 
30. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In Dandridge, the Court upheld a 
Maryland-HEW regulation that placed a per month ceiling on 
the amount a single family could receive in welfare benefits. 
31. This term the Supreme Court has the opportunity to 
prevent a gross abuse of particular poor children's independent 
interest in their education. In Johnson v. New York State 
Education Dept. plaintiff elementary children were deprived 
of all textbooks simply because they were too poor to pay the 
lending fee required by operation of state law. The district 
court refused even to convene a three-judge court, finding 
the claim insubstantial or foreclosed by prior decisions of the 
Supreme Court and dismissed the complaint. 319 F. Supp. 
271 (1971). The Court of Appeals affirmed, Judge Kaufmann, 
dissenting. 449 F. 2d 871 (2nd Cir. 1971). 
No more palpably imaginable deprivation of educational 
opportunity by reason of poverty exists except exclusion 
altogether from school. Perhaps, however, the situation is 
even worse: poor children sit bookless next to their wealthier 
classmates, directly stigmatized thereby as poor. I refuse 
to believe that Valtierra and Dandridge represent the total 
lack of concern of the Court under the Fourteenth 
Amendment for the poor necessary to uphold, or to refuse 
review of, this error. Cf. Boddie., supra note 21. 
32. 402 U.S. at 142-3. 
33. There is, of course, another possible reading of 
Valtierra. It could be maintained that the Court, in upholding 
the referendum in Valtierra, did so on the grounds that 
admitting low and moderate income housing would have 
had a deleterious effect on the tax situation in that community. 
However, that very deleterious effect is caused in part by 
the operation of present financing systems which Proposition I 
attacks. Therefore it is possible to allow for the decision in 
Valtierra and still conclude that the system of education 
finance must be changed; but to that extent, the underlying 
premise of Valtierra would no longer be operable. That is, 
it might be argued that within the present system the Court 
will uphold the referendum in Valtierra, because of its 
necessary consequences. That does not mean, however, that 
the causes of those consequences may not themselves be 
unconstitutional. Then Valtierra could be read as an urging 
by the Court to undo the underlying cause of the tax 
difficulty which would have resulted from the introduction 
of low and moderate income housing in the Valtierra 
situation. 
Of course, while this reading may be logically consistent, 
it is mere wishful thinking, given the political composition 
of the Valtierra court, to believe that the Court went through 
such a reasoning process. 
34. In 1957 a study of 36 standard metropolitan statistical 
areas suggested that central cities spent 31.3 % of their total 
fiscal package on education as compared with 53 % in the 
suburbs. A. Campbell and Sacks, Metropolitan America 
t 18 (1967). 
35. The counter of Coons, et al,, may be that such com-
petition is great; Proposition I merely insures that; at least 
for financing education, it should be done so that all start 
with the same set of advantages. A more forthright response 
is that a child's education dollars should not be made to 
depend on whether his family is willing to have a factory 
as a neighbor or on the inability to move into a rich district 
because the family is black or poor and the rich district 
effectively excludes the family. 
36. This interest in a state-created, and biased, market 
"free-for-all" is quite different from the state's interest in 
"subsidiarity," i.e., allowing small local decision-making 
units to control the raising and expenditure of funds. The 
interest in subsidiarity obviously can be easily served by any 
variety of alternative "fiscally neutral" methods of financing 
education. Rather the interest in the market model meets. 
the ethics of Proposition I head on. It represents an 
affirmative interest in what would be called-I believe 
properly-"naked privilege" by Coons, et al. My skepticism 
about the ultimate fate of Proposition I is merely that educa-
tion probably will not be viewed by the Court as so 
fundamental as to require removing such a massive and 
firmly entrenched, sometimes judicially favored, wealth 
classification from the American landscape. 
37. The California Supreme Court in Serrano went to 
great lengths to distinguish education from other services, 
and therefore to attempt to limit its declaration of un-
constitutionality to the area of education alone. See Serrano, 
supra note 5, at 609-10. 
38. In a forthcoming book Michelson and Grubb conclude 
that in Massachusetts the non-educational tax rate is a good 
measure of municipal overburden. They argue in support of 
the city taxpayer's claim: the non-education tax rate is non-
discretionary, no matter how wealthy the district. The 
Political Economy of School Resource Inequalities. The 
National Educational Finance Project reached a different 
conclusion after analysis of a sample of school districts 
from eight states: "no persuasive evidence of the existence 
of 'municipal overburden' was uncovered." Johns, et al., 
Alternative Programs of Financing Education 98 (1971). 
See also, Dimond, Reform of the Government of Education, 
Wayne L. Rev. 1005, 1007 n.9, 1025-26 n. 69(1970). 
39. See Johns, Ibid., 83-99 (1971). 
40. Michelson and Grubb have begun to undertake this 
task by examining the interrelationship among many 
variables including school tax rates, non-education tax 
rates, local school revenue per pupil, local revenue for non-
education purposes, property valuation, state school aid, 
federal school aid, mean family income, average daily 
attendance, children from low income families, and popula-
tion. Their work suggests many interesting interrelationships, 
causes, and effects. One of their most interesting conclusions 
is that "non-educational spending is, by and large, determined 
by factors beyond the control of communities, and tends 
not to be subject to discretion. Educational spending, on 
the other hand, is more constrained by the availability of 
fiscal resources. The school tax-rate will be lowered if 
non-educational requirements are high in burdened com-
munities, while the non-education rate is not similarly 
affected by a high school tax rate." An implication may be 
that district power-equalizing for school finance might 
enable some rich "unburdened" districts to join the others 
in not being able to tax for schools in accord with their 
"real" preferences and free some poor districts to express a 
preference in the rate of their school tax. 
Ironically, in a sample of 223 school districts in eight 
states, the National Education Finance Project found that 
major urban core cities in 1967 had higher market value of 
property per pupil than any other type school districts, 
including the suburbs. Johns, et al., supra note 38, at 91. 
Thus it is far from clear which types of school districts will 
be helped or hurt, and in what way, by the acceptance of 
Proposition I. Cf. notes 38 and 39 supra. 
41. The one thing all children share in common is tpat 
each is a child. Ergo--it's so_simple and fair--equal dollars 
per child, unless some other system of expenditure is neces-
sary to promote a compelling state interest. Examples might 
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be compensatory education for the disadvantaged or special 
education for the mentally or physically handicapped. 
Cf. note 26 supra. 
42. If permitted, the voucher, of course, might be spent 
at other than the present public school buildings. See, e.g., 
Arons, Equity, Option, and Vouchers, 72 Teacher's College 
Record 3371 (1971). 
43. Coons at 19-20. 
44. · How much more is not clear. Consider, for example, 
the following unanswered questions. Will poor districts 
make more effort? Or will rich districts treble their own 
efforts to maintain an expenditure advantage? If tax rates 
are raised, will property values go down and business leave, 
thus realtering the "wealth" of the district? Or will rich 
districts simply go out of business, thus insuring that poor 
districts will get relatively more tax dollars than the non-
existent districts but perhaps no more dollars than before? 
Will the total dollars for public schooling per pupil go up 
or down? What would be the effect, and constitutionality, 
of a remedy in which dollars were distributed in proportion 
to the giftedness of the child? If family tax effort is chosen, 
who will try "harder" and under what rate of return? See 
Coons at 413-420; Sugarman at 452-462. 
45. See, e.g., Kirp and Yudof, supra note 3, at 629. Cf. 
Hobson v. Hansen, supra note 11; Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 
437 F. 2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). 
46. See Center for Educational Policy Research, Education 
and Inequality: A Preliminary Report (1971) at 47-64. But 
see, Guthrie, et al., Schools and Inequality (1971); Michelson, 
Principal Power, 5 Inequality in Education 7 (1970). 
47. Given the present ignorance about what systematically 
works to improve schooling outcome for the child, we 
probably cannot make any but arbitrary definitions about 
the "quality" of schooling and the "performance" of 
teachers. 
48. Arguing for the irrelevance of money to the quality 
of education can, of course, be carried too far. There is, no 
doubt, a threshold level of expenditures that is essential to 
even begin decent education. See note 31 supra. There may 
be school districts today that cannot provide books, facilities, 
or teachers of any kind to all their children; to them the 
argument that quality and money have no relation must 
sound very hollow indeed. To the extent that re-shuffling 
of dollars within a state can help some school districts pro-
vide the threshold level of education expenditures, such 
re-shuffling will not be totally irrelevant to the quality of 
education those children will receive. But beyond this goal· 
of guaranteeing all schools a minimum level of expenditures, 
I have some difficulty tracing the effect of mere re-allocation 
of funds in the larger battle of significantly reforming 
the present system of education in order to make it work 
better, especially for the poor and racial minorities. 
49. That, of course, is not the primary ethic of Proposi-
tion I. See note 26 supra, for the corresponding definition 
of an alternative Proposition I. See also, Dimond, Toward 
a Children's Defense Fund, supra note 28, at 394. Cf. 
Hobson v. Hansen, supra note 11. 
50. Cf. J. Coleman, et al., Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (1965). 
51. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150 
(1955). 
52. C/.Coonsat415-417,419-420. 
53. See, e.g., Altshuler, Community Control 198 (1970); 
Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm's, 296 
F.Supp. 833 (E.D.L.A. 1967), afj'd 393 U.S. 17(1968); 
Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F. 2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970), 438 F. 
2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). 
54. See Dimond, School Segregation: There is but one 
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